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“I Now Pronounce You Husband and Son”:
Confronting the Need to Amend Adult
Adoption Codes to Facilitate Same-Sex
Marriage
Hope C. Blain

I. INTRODUCTION
“We never thought we’d see the day” where same-sex
marriage was legal in Pennsylvania, said Nino Esposito.1 But
with the Supreme Court’s legalization of same-sex marriage in
Obergefell v. Hodges,2 Nino Esposito and his partner of forty
years, Drew Bosee, saw that elusive day become a reality for all
Americans. Except, Mr. Esposito and Mr. Bosee still could not
marry. The problem: They were legally father and son. In 2012,
three years before the Supreme Court legalized same-sex
marriage across the nation, Mr. Esposito and Mr. Bosee adopted
each other.3 For them, their decision to adopt was motivated by a
desire to secure inheritance and medical visitation rights, and
more importantly, it was motivated by a desire to be legally
considered a family.4

 For the inspiration of my title, see Rich Schapiro, Gay Pennsylvania Couple Seeks to
Annul Adoption that Fetched them Inheritance Rights Now that Same-Sex Marriage is Legal,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 3, 2015, 10:52 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/gaypa-couple-annul-adoption-wed-article-1.2422060 [http://perma.cc/SM58-DG8N].
 J.D. Candidate, Expected May 2019, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of
Law. Thank you to Professor Stephanie Lascelles, my faculty advisor, for her mentorship,
guidance, and insight during the writing process. Also, thank you to my family for their
unending love, support, and patience throughout my life—but especially during law school.
1 Evan Perez & Ariane de Vogue, Couple Seeks Right to Marry. The Hitch? They’re Legally
Father and Son, CNN (Nov. 3, 2015, 3:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/11/03/politics/same-sexmarriage-adoption-father-son-pennsylvania/index.html [http://perma.cc/JEH2-9RB4].
2 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent
in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and
that liberty.”).
3 Yanan Wang, These gay men became ‘father and son.’ Now they want to get
married but can’t, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2015/11/05/these-gay-men-became-father-and-son-now-they-want-to-get-married-butcant/?utm_term=.80781b46a6f4 [http://perma.cc/34AG-LGTS].
4 See id.
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With the legalization of same-sex marriage, the couple sought
to annul their adoption and exercise their inherent right to
marry.5 On March 23, 2015, Mr. Esposito and Mr. Bosee filed a
petition to revoke their adoption with the Allegheny County Court
of Common Pleas Orphan’s Court in Pennsylvania.6 Their petition
even included an affidavit of Mr. Bosee’s consent to the adoption
annulment.7 Yet, the Orphan’s Court rejected the couple’s petition
reasoning that state law barred the adoption revocation.8 On
appeal, the Superior Court reversed and found that denying the
adoption annulment “frustrated the couple’s ability to marry,”
which directly conflicted with Obergefell.9 While the Superior
Court remanded the case and expressly gave the lower court the
authority to annul same-sex adult adoptions, it failed to provide
any guidance or requirements to swiftly effectuate the adoption
annulments.10 Now, years after the couple attempted to annul
their adoption, it seems they have still not been able to marry as
they await the formal revocation of their adoption.11
Stuck in this legal limbo-land, Mr. Esposito and Mr. Bosee
are not alone. While there is “no reliable data—or even flimsy
data” regarding the number of same-sex adult adoptions,12 many
same-sex couples across the nation turned to adult adoption to
create a legal family unit.13 In fact, adult adoption was arguably
the only way to legally formalize same-sex relationships, allowing
couples to secure essential insurance benefits and inheritance
rights.14 However, with the legalization of same-sex marriage in
In re Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d 332, 333 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
Id.
Id. Note, this Article uses the terms “adoption revocation,” “adoption annulment,”
and “adoption termination” interchangeably.
8 See Schapiro, supra note . The Orphan’s Court reasoned that state law prohibited
the adoption revocation since Pennsylvania’s adoption code does not contain any provision
regarding adoption revocation and, historically, only permitted revocation under rare
circumstances, such as clear and convincing evidence of fraud. 17 WEST’S PA. PRAC.,
FAMILY LAW § 32:15 (7th ed. 2017).
9 Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d at 336.
10 Id.
11 See id. It is unclear if the couple is now married. See Chris Potter, Adoption decision ends
marriage predicament for gay couples in Pennsylvania, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 21, 2016,
9:12 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/north/2016/12/21/Pennsylvania-court-ruling-clearsway-for-gay-Fox-Chapel-couple-to-marry/stories/201612210196 [http://perma.cc/H42D-D39B].
12 Elon Green, The Lost History of Gay Adult Adoption, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/19/magazine/the-lost-history-of-gay-adult-adoption.html
[http://perma.cc/PC4X-9DSE] (“The practice seems to have taken hold amid the tumult of
the 1970s and 1980s, during rampant discrimination and the onset of the AIDs crisis.”).
13 Brynne E. McCabe, Adult Adoption: The Varying Motives, Potential Consequences,
and Ethical Considerations, 22 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 300, 306 (2009).
14 See Gwendolyn L. Snodgrass, Creating Family Without Marriage: The Advantages
and Disadvantages of Adult Adoption among Gay and Lesbian Partners, 36 BRANDEIS J.
FAM. L. 75, 75–76 (1998) (noting that same-sex couples could also use wills, insurance
policies, partnership agreements, and durable powers of attorney to establish some
5
6
7
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2015, the motivations behind these adult adoptions became
obsolete since all couples now had the right to marry.15 Yet, even
with the recognition of this fundamental right, some same-sex
couples who adopted each other, like Mr. Esposito and Mr. Bosee,
cannot easily exercise their right to marry because adoption is
often irrevocable and most states lack any formal revocation
process.16 Thus, confronted with couples that cannot exercise
their constitutional right to marry, states17 must reform their
adoption codes to effectuate the efficient annulment of same-sex
adult adoptions.
Adoption, including adult adoption, did not exist at common
law.18 Instead, adoption is a product of state-specific statutory
language.19 Therefore, given adoption’s statutory origins, any
solution to Mr. Esposito’s, Mr. Bosee’s, and countless other
same-sex couples’ problem should be statutory in nature.
However currently, many state adoption codes fail to even
mention adult adoption revocation and lack any statutory
revocation procedure.20 Instead, most adoption codes highlight
the extreme permanency of adult adoption or only permit adoption
revocation within an extremely narrow timeframe.21 In fact, only
one state provides a detailed adult adoption revocation
procedure—California.22 California’s Family Code dedicates an
entire section to adult adoption revocation and details a
comprehensive process for individuals seeking revocation. 23
Further, not only does California’s adoption code provide a
comprehensive revocation procedure, it ensures that both the
legally recognized rights, but “adoption [was] the only solution that [created] a bona
fide family relationship”).
15 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
16 See Schapiro, supra note ; see also Peter N. Fowler, Adult Adoption: A “New”
Legal Tool for Lesbians and Gay Men, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 667, 706 (1984)
(“Except in very narrow circumstances, or unless the statute provides for it, once an
individual has adopted her/his lover, the adoption cannot be abrogated.”).
17 Unless otherwise indicated, for the purposes of this Article, “states” includes all
fifty states and the District of Columbia.
18 McCabe, supra note 13, at 302.
19 See id.
20 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9340 (1993).
21 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-216 (2018) (“[U]pon the expiration of one (1) year
after an adoption decree is issued, the decree cannot be questioned by any person
including the petitioner [the individual that sought the adoption], in any manner upon
any ground, including fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give any required notice, or
lack of jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter . . . .”); see also ALASKA STAT.
ANN. § 25.23.130 (West 1974) (“[A]ll legal relationships between the adopted person and
the natural parents and other relatives of the adopted person, so that the adopted person
thereafter is a stranger to the former relatives for all purposes . . . .” (emphasis added)).
22 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9340 (1993).
23 See generally id. Within California’s Family Code, Division 13 “Adoption” includes
Part 3 “Adoption of Adults and married Minors” which includes Chapter 3 “Procedure for
Terminating Adult Adoption.” See id.
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adoptee and the adopter are protected by requiring the consent of
both parties.24 Although improvements can be made to California’s
adoption code, all states should look to California’s statutory
language as a model and amend their respective codes accordingly.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly discusses
the current need to amend state adoption codes to allow same-sex
couples that adopted each other pre-Obergefell to efficiently
annul their adult adoption and marry. Part II provides
background on the legal avenues open to same-sex couples to
solidify their relationships pre-Obergefell. This section also
discusses the history and ramifications of Obergefell. Part III
delves into the problem—same-sex couples that adopted each
other pre-Obergefell often cannot, or at least cannot efficiently,
annul their adoption. Part IV provides a solution. This Part
outlines the need to amend state adoption codes by comparing states
that lack statutory guidance25 with the one state that has a clear
statutory framework for adult adoption revocation—California.26
Part IV advocates for states to adopt language similar to California’s
statutory language, which requires that both the adoptee and the
adopter provide consent before a formal adoption revocation is
granted.27 Further, Part IV discusses the importance of
implementing a statutory framework, as opposed to relying on
equitable relief, since courts and same-sex couples alike need clear
and comprehensive statutory requirements.
II. BACKGROUND
Adoption is “[t]he creation by judicial order of a parent-child
relationship.”28 Adult adoption is the creation of a parent-child
relationship between two adults.29 In both the adoption of a child
and of an adult, the adoption bestows significant inheritance,
medical, and countless other rights upon those involved.30 A
noteworthy difference between child adoption and adult adoption
is the underlying motivation. Unlike the motivations behind
child adoption, which usually center on a desire to provide a child
Id.
See, e.g., 17 WEST’S PA. PRAC., FAMILY LAW § 32:15 (7th ed. 2017).
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9340 (1993).
Id.
Adoption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Fowler, supra note
16, at 677 (“[T]he adoptive parent in an adult adoption bears no legal duty of support for
her/his adult child.”). While adoption has ancient roots and can be traced back to the Code
of Hammurabi, adoption did not exist at common law and is the product of state specific
statutes. See 17 WEST’S PA. PRAC., FAMILY LAW § 32:1 (7th ed. 2017).
29 See Adoption, supra note 28.
30 See Fowler, supra note 16, at 679 (“In every American jurisdiction, if an
unmarried intestate decedent is survived by an adopted child, but no natural-born
descendants, the adopted child inherits the entire estate.”).
24
25
26
27
28
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with basic necessities,31 adult adoption has been historically
utilized for “strictly economic purposes, especially inheritance.”32
A. American Adult Adoption: A Legal Avenue for Same-Sex
Couples
Before the nationwide legalization of same-sex marriage,
adult adoption served as one avenue to legally formalize
same-sex relationships. Other legal options, like civil unions and
domestic partnerships, existed, but were often not as widely
available as adult adoption. For example, as of November 2014,
only four states allowed for civil unions between same-sex
couples and only six states and the District of Columbia allowed
for domestic partnerships between same-sex couples,33 whereas
most states recognize, and have recognized adult adoption for
decades.34 Further, adoption bestowed more expansive benefits
than the other available options.35
For example, one available method to formalize same-sex
relationships was a domestic partnership. Yet, a domestic
partnership was a “municipality-based convention, unrecognized
by state legislatures,” that only extended limited employment
benefits to the domestic partner—with those benefits chosen at
the complete discretion of the employer.36 Further, unlike
adoption, domestic partnerships did not “create heirs or establish
property or inheritance rights.”37
Another common means of formalizing same-sex relationships
pre-Obergefell were cohabitation contracts.38 Cohabitation contracts
allowed same-sex couples to live together as if married, provide
companionship, and share earnings and property.39 However, the
contract was only enforceable if legitimate consideration,
independent of the sexual relationship, existed.40 And even if the

See supra text accompanying note 16.
In re Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
Jodi B. Mileto, Note, Fallout from Obergefell: The Dissolution of Unconventional
Adoptions to Pave the Way for Same-Sex Marriage Equality, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 285, 294 (2017).
34 See Fowler, supra note 16, at 673 (commenting that Arizona and Nebraska were
the only states that did not authorize adult adoption in 1984); see also Who May Adopt, be
Adopted, or Place a Child for Adoption, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY (2016),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/parties.pdf#page=5&view=SummariesofStatelaws
[http://perma.cc/G2AC-SJP9] (noting, that as of 2016, Louisiana, Missouri, Idaho, South
Carolina, and Wyoming did not permit adult adoption).
35 Snodgrass, supra note 14, at 77.
36 Domestic Partnership, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Snodgrass,
supra note 14, at 76.
37 Snodgrass, supra note 14, at 76.
38 See id. at 77; see generally Whorton v. Dillingham, 202 Cal. App. 3d 447 (1988).
39 Snodgrass, supra note 14, at 77.
40 See id.
31
32
33
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contract was enforceable, property distribution was the only right
provided by the contract and was only enforced upon the dissolution
of the relationship.41 Thus, unfortunately, cohabitation contracts only
provided enforceable rights if the relationship ended.
Similarly, other legal avenues, such as “[w]ills, insurance
policies, trusts, health-care proxies, partnership agreements[, and]
durable powers of attorney,” were available, but none created the
depth of legal rights that accompanied adoption.42 For example,
wills, especially reciprocal wills, and trusts provided an avenue for
same-sex couples to leave property to each other. But, “the
greatest threat to each [of these options was a] surviving blood
relative wielding a charge of undue influence.”43 Such a threat was
not uncommon. Due to the stigma of homosexuality, wills and
trusts made by homosexual individuals were historically more
likely to be successfully challenged than wills and trusts made by
heterosexual individuals.44 Thus, using a will or trust to create
inheritance rights was a gamble for same-sex couples. There was
no guarantee that the same-sex partner would ever receive the
bequeathed property.45
Thus, while each aforementioned option provided some legal
benefits to same-sex couples, they often had severe limitations.
Moreover, they all failed to establish inalienable inheritance
rights and create a cognizable family unit.
Unlike other options available in the pre-Obergefell world,
adult adoption allowed same-sex couples to “formally and legally
express their commitment to one another by creating a family
unit.”46 Not only did adoption bestow the legal label of “family” on
a same-sex couple, it also provided vast legal rights, including
inheritance, successorship, next-of-kin, and beneficiary rights.47
Such comprehensive rights and privileges illustrate why same-sex
couples often chose adult adoption over other legal avenues.
One of the most significant benefits of adoption was the
creation of inheritance rights, which vested immediately upon
the adoption and required no other legal instrument.48 Further,
“every state honor[ed] the rights of an adopted child [or adult] to
inherit the estate of an unmarried intestate decedent over the
See id.
Id. at 75–77. Unlike adoption, the other avenues were merely contract-based methods
to secure rights. Id. at 76.
43 Id. at 78.
44 Id. at 79.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 80–81.
47 Id. 81–83.
48 Id. at 81.
41
42

Do Not Delete

2019]

5/22/2019 8:42 PM

I Now Pronounce You Husband and Son

415

rights of the decedent’s ‘nonimmediate’ blood relatives.”49 Thus,
through the fairly simple legal act of adoption, same-sex couples
were able to cut off blood relatives and solidify their inheritance
rights. In addition to inheritance rights, adoption also established
successorship rights. For example, same-sex couples successfully
used adult adoption to “safeguard possession” of rent-controlled
apartments upon the death of a partner.50 Moreover, adoption also
provided benefits during the lives of both partners through
next-of-kin privileges.51 The next-of-kin designation allowed a
person to be legally recognized as the “closest living relative of
another,” which in turn provided “privileges in case of
hospitalization or imprisonment [and conferred] decision-making
authority in case of emergency or incapacity.”52 Additionally, adult
adoption also allowed same-sex couples to take advantage of
beneficiary privileges.53 Beneficiary privileges allowed a surviving
same-sex partner to collect “insurance policies, retirement funds,
and employee benefits.”54 In short, with the vast benefits and
rights conferred by adult adoption, it was often used to create a
pseudo-marriage between same-sex couples.
Many have argued that the use of adult adoption in this
way—creating a parent-child relationship when there is clearly a
sexual relationship—perverts adoption’s purpose.55 While it is
true that the parent-child relationship is a legal fiction within
these same-sex adult adoptions, many courts have found that the
motivations behind these adult adoptions are legitimate and
sincere.56 For example, in In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous,
the New York Family Court of Kings County granted a same-sex
couple’s petition for adoption.57 The couple, a twenty-two-year-old
male and his twenty-six-year-old male partner, desired to create
“a legally cognizable relationship.”58 The court granted the
adoption despite challenges stemming from public policy and
morality concerns.59 Moreover, in In re Adult Anonymous II, the
Supreme Court of New York reversed an order denying a
Id.
Id. at 82 (noting that adult adoption was used to successfully bypass New York
City’s rent and eviction regulations which “provide[d] that no surviving spouse or relative
of a deceased tenant will be evicted so long as that person lived with the tenant while the
tenant was alive”).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 83.
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 16, at 668–69.
56 See, e.g., In re Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199–201 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982); see also McCabe, supra note 13, at 307–08.
57 In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
58 Id. at 527.
59 Id. at 531; see also McCabe, supra note 13, at 308.
49
50
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same-sex couple’s adult adoption.60 The court found that the couple’s
motivation for entering into the adoption—to avoid eviction—was
sincere and not a manipulation of the adoption statute.61
Furthermore, the court noted that “[h]istorically . . . [adult] adoption
has served as a legal mechanism for achieving economic, political,
and social objectives rather than the stereotypical parent-child
relationship.”62 Thus, as the precedent cases and literature make
clear, same-sex adult adoption was not a perversion of adoption,
but rather a sincere attempt to create a family—the very
purpose of adoption.
But the rights created by adoption come at a price: Finality.
Absent a showing of undue influence or fraud, adult adoption is
often irrevocable.63 Therefore, even if the romantic relationship
ends, the legal relationship of parent-child remains. Case in
point, if the romantic relationship sours and the adopter or
“parent” disinherits the adoptee or “child” by excluding the
adoptee from his or her will, the adoptee will always have
standing to contest the adopter’s will because the adoptee is
forever a bona fide child of the adopter.64 As such, the
irrevocability of adult adoption is considered its most significant
flaw because it creates an immutable legal relationship,
remaining even after death.
Moreover, adult adoption’s permanency also forever removes
the adoptee from his or her biological bloodline.65 Thus, adult
adoption terminates the adoptee’s natural right to inherit from
his or her biological parents and places the adoptee into the
adopter’s bloodline. Once the adult adoption is complete the
adoptee can never restore his or her right to inherit from the
biological parents.66 This is highly problematic for the adoptee if
the same-sex relationship ends and the adoptee is excluded from
the adopter’s will. In this scenario, the adoptee would be up the
proverbial creek without a paddle; she would not inherit from her
biological parents or her same-sex partner, the adopter.67

Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 200.
See 17 WEST’S PA. PRAC., FAMILY LAW § 32:15 (7th ed. 2017); but see CAL. FAM.
CODE § 9340 (1993). Further, even in the presence of fraud, an adoption often cannot be
revoked. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-216 (2018).
64 Snodgrass, supra note 14, at 83–84.
65 Id. at 84.
66 Id.
67 In this situation the adoptee would have two options: (1) seek a devise from the
biological parents, which would be moot if they are both deceased, or (2) contest the
adopter’s will. See id.
60
61
62
63
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Same-sex adult adoption may also bring about significant
psychological ramifications. Same-sex couples that turn to adult
adoption have to cope with the legal dynamics of their
relationship—father and son by day, lovers by night. While
courts have consistently upheld the motivations behind these
adoptions,68 their legal fiction may create tension between
relatives, friends, and even between the same-sex couple.69
Therefore, while adult adoption was a viable option for same-sex
couples, it was an inappropriate method to achieve the legal
status that these couples desired and deserved: Marriage.70
B. Obergefell & its Outcomes
At its core, Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized same-sex
marriage, is about the interlocking constitutional guarantees of
liberty and equality.71 Justice Kennedy began the monumental
decision by highlighting the foundation of our country—the
Constitution—which “promises liberty to all within its reach, a
liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons
within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”72 The
Constitution’s promise of liberty and equality was the cornerstone
of Justice Kennedy Kennedy’s opinion.
The petitioners in Obergefell were fourteen same-sex couples
and two men whose same-sex partners were deceased.73 The
petitioners had filed individual actions in federal district court
arguing that their respective states violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying them the right to marry or by failing to
recognize their marriages lawfully performed in other states.74
The respondents were state officials responsible for enforcing
state laws that denied same-sex couples the ability to marry.75 In
each action, the district courts found for the petitioners.76 But the
Sixth Circuit, consolidating the cases, reversed, finding that
states do not have a constitutional obligation to license or
recognize same-sex marriage.77

68 See In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1981); see also In re Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200, 201 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
69 Snodgrass, supra note 14, at 84.
70 See Lisa R. Zimmer, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 681, 691 (1990).
71 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
72 Id. at 2593 (emphasis added).
73 Id.
74 Id. The states at issue were Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. Id. All of
these states defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman. Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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Before addressing the substance of the petitioners’ legal
claims, the Court delved into the “transcendent importance” of
marriage and the tragic outcomes caused by prohibiting same-sex
marriage.78 Noting marriage’s significance, the Court stated that
“marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and
aspirations” and arises “from the most basic human needs.”79
Further, as the Court aptly noted, it was and is the importance of
marriage that instigated the petitioners’ claims.80 Far from
trying to demean the institution of marriage, as the respondents
genuinely believed, the petitioners sought the ability to be a part
of an institution they revered.81
Turning to the facts, the Court outlined the petitioners’
challenges.82 Take petitioners April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse of
Michigan as an example. Ms. DeBoer and Ms. Rowse celebrated
their relationship in a commitment ceremony in 2007.83 Over the
years their family had grown.84 In 2009, they adopted a baby boy
and took in another baby boy that was abandoned by his
biological mother.85 “The next year a baby girl with special needs
joined their family.”86 But in the eyes of Michigan law, Ms.
DeBoer and Ms. Rowse could never truly be a “family” because
they both could not be their children’s legal parents.87 Under
Michigan law, only married couples and single individuals could
adopt children, “so each child [could] have only one woman as his
or her legal parent.”88 This legal separation, caused by the
couple’s unmarried status, posed serious problems for their
family. If there was an emergency, schools, hospitals, and
first-responders would have to “treat the three children as if they
had only one parent.”89 And if Ms. DeBoer or Ms. Rowse became
ill or died, the other woman would have no legal rights over the
children she had not adopted—she might even lose those
children.90 This ever-present uncertainty, caused by the couples’
inability to marry, led them to take legal action.91

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 2594.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2595.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Similarly, petitioner James Obergefell’s claim stemmed from
the same uncertainty caused by his inability to marry his partner.
Together for over two decades, Mr. Obergefell and his partner,
John Arthur, promised to marry before Mr. Arthur died.92
However, same-sex marriage was illegal in their home state of
Ohio.93 “To fulfill their . . . promise, [Mr. Obergefell and Mr.
Arthur] traveled from Ohio to Maryland, where same-sex
marriage was legal.94 Struggling with the debilitating effects of
ALS, Mr. Arthur was unable to move, so the couple was married
inside a medical transport plane on a tarmac in Maryland.95
Mr. Arthur died three months later.96 Although they were lawfully
married in Maryland, “Ohio law [did] not permit Obergefell to be
listed as the surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate.”97
Thus, “[b]y statute, [Mr. Obergefell and Mr. Arthur] must remain
strangers even in death . . . .”98
Turning to the legal claims at hand, the Court determined
that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry by
analyzing two core constitutional principles—liberty and
equality.99 The Court found that marriage was a constitutional
liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.100 To reach its
conclusion, the Court discussed four interrelated principles.101
First, the Court reasoned that marriage is a highly personal
choice rooted in the concept of individual autonomy.102 Looking at
past precedent, the Court determined that personal decisions
regarding marriage, including same-sex marriage, are “among
the most intimate that an individual can make” as these
decisions have the power to define an individual, while
simultaneously binding that individual to another.103 And, thus,
the right to marry, like other intimate personal choices
92 Id. at 2594. Mr. Arthur was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”)
in 2011. Id. This condition has no known cure. Id.
93 Id. at 2593.
94 Id. at 2594.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 2598, 2603.
100 Id. at 2602–03. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
include “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597.
101 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
102 Id.
103 Id.; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
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“concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and
childrearing,” deserves protection under the Constitution.104
Second, the Court opined that the right to marry is
guaranteed by the Constitution “because it supports a two-person
union unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals.”105 Drawing on the Court’s decision in Turner
v. Safley, which held that inmates could not be denied their right
to marry,106 and Loving v. Virginia, which invalidated interracial
marriage bans,107 the Court found that same-sex couples, too,
have the right to find companionship and participate in a
legally-recognized relationship.108
Third, the Court reasoned that safeguarding all individuals’
right to marry protects children, the future of American society.109
By recognizing same-sex marriage, same-sex relationships are
afforded legal legitimacy, which in turn allows children of
same-sex couples “to understand the integrity and closeness of
their own family and its concord with other families in their
community and in their daily lives.”110 In other words, it ensures
that children of same-sex couples are not labeled the “other.” Thus,
excluding same-sex marriage would cause these children to “suffer
the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”111
Fourth, the Court noted that the right to marry is protected
under the Constitution because, quite simply, marriage is the
“keystone of [American] social order.”112 It is an essential
building block of American life. The Court reasoned that the
fundamental importance of marriage in America is evident in
“the constellation of benefits” awarded to couples just by virtue of
their marriage.113 In fact, the Court listed fourteen categories of
benefits awarded to married couples.114 And the Court reasoned
104 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386
(1978) (finding that it would be contradictory “to recognize a right of privacy with respect
to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the
relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society”).
105 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
106 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987).
107 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
108 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“Marriage responds to the universal fear that a
lonely person might call out only to find no one there. It offers the hope of companionship
and understanding and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care
for the other.”).
109 Id.
110 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013).
111 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
112 Id. at 2601.
113 Id.
114 Id. Marital benefits in the United States include:
[T]axation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal
privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decision-making
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that excluding same-sex couples from the opportunity to receive any
of these benefits “demeans gays and lesbians [and] lock[s] them out
of a central institution of the Nation’s society.”115 With these
benefits in mind, the Court declared that the continued prohibition
of same-sex marriage was inconsistent with the tenants of the
Constitution: “Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in
marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it
would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to
deny them this right.”116
Additionally, the Court also reasoned that denying same-sex
couples their fundamental right to marry violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.117 Quite simply,
the Court opined that marriage laws that deny same-sex couples
the ability to marry, while affording opposite-sex couples that
ability, are unequal and, thus, unconstitutional.118 Therefore, the
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited any law that
deprived same-sex couples of their inherent right to marry.119
C. Adoption v. Marriage—Why the need to get Hitched?
Since adult adoption affords same-sex couples vast legal
benefits,120 one may ask why couples would trouble themselves
with the hassle of the adoption revocation process to simply
marry.121 While there is considerable overlap between the
benefits offered by adoption and marriage,122 the motivations to
revoke an adult adoption and subsequently marry include
significant economic and legal benefits unique to marriage. And,
perhaps, the most important motivation to marry is psychological

authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death
certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’
compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and
visitation rules.
Id.

Id. at 2602.
Id.
Id. at 2604.
Id.
Id. at 2604–05.
See Snodgrass, supra note 14, at 75–76 (noting that same-sex couples also had the
option to use wills, insurance policies, partnership agreements, and durable powers of
attorney to establish some legally recognized rights, but “adoption [was] the only solution
that [created] a bona fide family relationship”).
121 In many states, adoption is irrevocable. See e.g., 17 WEST’S PA. PRAC., FAMILY LAW
§ 32:15 (7th ed. 2017).
122 Buchanan, No. 2015 DRB 4111, 2016 WL 2755848, at *1 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18,
2016) (implying that comparable hospital visitation rights and inheritance rights are
bestowed by both adoption and marriage).
115
116
117
118
119
120
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and stems from securing the status of a married individual—a
status that has eluded same-sex couples for decades.123
As Obergefell noted, there are numerous economic benefits
to marriage124 (many of which differ or are more advantageous
than adoption benefits). In fact, laws benefiting married
individuals “permeate nearly every field of social regulation in
this country—taxation . . . social welfare, inheritance, adoption,
and on and on.”125 Of the hundreds of federal financial marital
benefits, the social security system is arguably the most valuable
because it provides spousal benefits for retirement, disability,
and survivorship.126 For example, most married couples, and
even some divorced couples, “have the option to claim either their
own Social Security benefits or spousal benefits under their
spouse’s earnings.”127 This benefit can result in sizable monetary
benefits if one spouse earned significantly less than the other or
did not pay into Social Security for a prolonged period.128 These
options are simply not available to adult adoptees since the
Social Security Administration places significant restrictions on
an adoptee’s ability to collect benefits.129
Moreover, federal and state tax and inheritance laws often
provide significant benefits to married individuals. Marriage,
unlike adoption, allows individuals to file joint tax returns and
escape gift and estate taxes.130 In fact, the new federal tax law
may privilege married individuals more than ever before.131 For
instance, in the 2017 tax year, married couples faced a possible
tax penalty for filing jointly if their individual incomes were at or

See KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE
(2006) (noting that during the 1970s same-sex couples throughout the nation
unsuccessfully sought marriage rights).
124 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
125 David L. Chambers, What if? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 447 (1996).
126 See Beth Braverman, The Financial Benefits of Marriage, CONSUMER REP. (last
updated Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/marriage/financial-benefits-ofmarriage/ [http://perma.cc/B6NZ-B936]; M.V. Lee Badgett, The Economic Value of Marriage
for Same-Sex Couples, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 1081, 1092 (2010).
127 Braverman, supra note 126; Benefits for your spouse, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/applying6.html [http://perma.cc/NV4G-FXB7].
128 Benefits for your spouse, supra note 127.
129 Can children and students get Social Security benefits?, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. (last
updated July 2, 2018), https://faq.ssa.gov/en-US/Topic/article/KA-02053 [http://perma.cc/H26KL4PS] (noting that adopted children may receive their parents social security benefits
only if they are unmarried and are either minors or adults with a disability that begin
before they were twenty-two years old).
130 HULL, supra note 123, at 119.
131 Cf. Braverman, supra note 126 (discussing that, while the new tax law benefits
married individuals, it severely limits married individuals’ ability to take sizable itemized
deductions, capping them at $10,000).
123
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exceeded $80,000.132 But that penalty will largely disappear in
the 2018 tax year.133 Under the new tax law, “only households
with a combined income of $600,000 or more will pay a tax
penalty for getting hitched.”134 Clearly, adult adoption does not
provide a comparable benefit.135 Furthermore, while both adult
adoption and marriage provide some level of inheritance rights,
marriage provides more secure inheritance rights. Case in point,
if the adopter in a same-sex adult adoption marries another
person, then the adoptee would not automatically inherit from
the intestate adoptor. In that situation, marriage trumps
adoption. Marriage would allow the surviving spouse to collect the
entirety of adopter’s estate, leaving the adoptee with nothing.136
Further, an adoptee child’s inheritance rights can generally be
terminated by excluding them from a will, whereas, in some states
a spouse is guaranteed a share of their partner’s estate.137
Intrinsically tied to its financial benefits, marriage, unlike
adoption, provides a formal legal exit strategy—divorce.138 State
and federal laws provide married individuals seeking marriage
dissolution with rules and guidelines concerning property
distribution, alimony, and child support.139 These guidelines are a
far cry from the overwhelming grey-area that surrounds adult
adoption revocation. In fact, unlike the clear legal procedure
available to dissolve a marriage, there is no universal mechanism to
annul an adult adoption.140 Thus, when a relationship ends,
married individuals have defined legal procedures to follow,
whereas, adopted same-sex couples only have uncertainty. In short,
instead of grappling with the finality of adoption and the immense
time and money associated with seeking adoption revocation,

Id.
Id.
Id.
In fact, with the elimination of the personal exemption from federal income tax, there
is arguably less of a financial incentive to adopt, as the adopter can no longer take the
adoptee’s personal exemption. I make this point fully knowing that most adult adoptees would
not be considered a dependent; thus historically, the adopter would likely not be able to take a
personal exemption for the adult adoptee. However, arguably, some same-sex adult adoptees
have been claimed as a dependent by the adopter for federal income tax purposes.
136 This situation presumes that the adopter died intestate.
137 See HULL, supra note 123, at 119. For example, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Puerto
Rico have “forced heir” statutes that prohibit spousal disinheritance. 95 C.J.S. § 80 (2018).
Whereas, Vermont, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Washington have statutes that prohibit
the testator from depriving the surviving spouse of a certain share of the estate, unless
the surviving spouse consents or waives their right to the share. Id.
138 Mileto, supra note 33, at 293.
139 See EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY
PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO MARRY 13 (2004).
140 Mileto, supra note 33, at 303–04.
132
133
134
135
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“marriage even makes separation and divorce more streamlined by
allowing access to legal and financial guidelines.”141
While certainly not as significant as the benefits discussed
above, another marital benefit is spousal evidentiary privilege.142
Both federal and state law shield married couples from testifying
against each other in certain legal proceedings and deem marital
communications confidential.143 Such an evidentiary privilege
simply does not extend to the parent-child relationship. This
benefit, while arguably not as important or heavily utilized as
tax or inheritance benefits, illustrates the importance of
marriage in American society. Namely, all of these benefits,
including the evidentiary privilege, were created by the
government to “protect and foster [the] emotional attachments”
between only one sect of American society—married individuals.
No other relationship is given such sweeping protection and
privilege under the law.
Americans’ reverence for the institution of marriage leads to
the most significant motivation behind same-sex couples’ desire
to annul their adoption and marry: Securing the label of
“married.” Same-sex couples fought for decades to secure this
label because the word itself “carries prestige [and] status” in
American culture.144 As Obergefell eloquently stated, marriage
“[promises] nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to
their station in life.”145 Thus, faced with an opportunity to
marry—an opportunity that most same-sex couples never
thought would come—it seems natural that individuals like Mr.
Esposito and Mr. Bosee would fervently desire to revoke their
adoptions and exercise their constitutional right to marry.

Id. at 293.
Other minor marital benefits include the ability to recover damages in tort for
actions committed against a spouse. See HULL, supra note 123, at 119. Married
individuals have the right to recover economic losses in wrongful death cases involving
their spouse and also have the opportunity to seek loss of consortium resulting from the
death or injury of their spouse. See 2 AM. LAW OF TORTS § 8.22 (2018) (defining
consortium as encompassing the financial support and services rendered by spouses,
including the intangible elements of “affection, society, companionship, and sexual
relations”) (internal citations omitted). However, it should be noted that adoption has
comparable benefits. See Snodgrass, supra note 14, at 82–83. Adoption allows the adopter
or adoptee to recover damages in torts for actions committed against the adoptee or
adopter, respectively. Id. Adoption also allows the adoptee to seek loss of parental
consortium, however such action is not as widely recognized or accepted as loss of spousal
consortium. See Can children claim loss of consortium for a parent’s injury, or vice versa?
ROTTENSTEIN LAW GROUP LLP, http://www.rotlaw.com/legal-library/can-children-claimloss-of-consortium-for-a-parents-injury-or-vice-versa/ [http://perma.cc/GZU5-2EEX].
143 WOLFSON, supra note 139, at 14.
144 Mileto, supra note 33, at 293.
145 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (emphasis added).
141
142
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With the legalization of same-sex marriage, Mr. Esposito and
Mr. Bosee and other same-sex couples can legally transition from
a parent-child relationship to a spousal partnership. Such a
change, legally and psychologically, allows their relationship and
other same-sex relationships to be celebrated with the same
legitimacy as heterosexual marriages. In sum, adult adoption,
while a viable option, never provided an adequate definition for
the relationship between same-sex couples.146 Now same-sex
couples have the opportunity to take part in a legal and social
institution that truly reflects their intimate union. As Obergefell
noted, “[n]o union is more profound than marriage, for it
embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice,
and family.”147 Now the question is how to efficiently facilitate
the marriage of these adopted same-sex couples.
III. THE PROBLEM: APPLYING OBERGEFELL TO EXISTING
SAME-SEX ADULT ADOPTIONS
While the Court in Obergefell opened the door for
approximately ten million Americans to marry,148 it also created
the very predicament that Mr. Esposito, Mr. Bosee, and other
same-sex couples now face. By legalizing same-sex marriage, the
Court eliminated the motivations behind same-sex adult
adoption and also indirectly highlighted an inherent flaw of adult
adoption: Irrevocability.149 While the Court strived to allow all
individuals to marry, its holding cannot be fully achieved because
adult adoption cannot easily be revoked in most states. In fact,
the Court in Obergefell, unknowingly, created a new legal hurdle
for some same-sex couples.
Unlike marriage, which can be legally terminated through
divorce, “divorcing” an adult adoptee is an unsettled legal
matter.150 Generally, adult adoptions are irrevocable, but may be
revoked under “narrow circumstances, or [if] the statute provides
for it.”151 Thus, given adoption’s general irrevocability, adopted
same-sex couples face an utter lack of legal mechanisms or
procedures when attempting to revoke their adoptions. In fact,
many states lack any statutory reference to adult adoption
Zimmer, supra note 70, at 691.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
Gary Gates, In U.S. More Adults Identifying as LGBT, GALLUP (Jan 11, 2017),
http://news.gallup.com/poll/201731/lgbt-identification-rises.aspx [http://perma.cc/5856-S3BW]
(finding that 4.1% of the American population, roughly 10 million people, identifies as LGBT
[Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender]).
149 See Richard C. Ausness, Planned Parenthood: Adult Adoption and the Right of
Adoptees to Inherit, 41 ACTEC L.J. 241, 246 (2016).
150 Mileto, supra note 33, at 301.
151 Fowler, supra note 16, at 706.
146
147
148
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revocation.152 The remainder of this Part discusses multiple cases
where same-sex couples that adopted each other pre-Obergefell
confront the utterly inefficient adult adoption revocation process.
A. The District of Columbia: Buchanan153
In 2002, Donald Ray Buchanan and Thomas Ainora entered
into an adult adoption to secure legal protections and rights since
they were unable to marry.154 However, with the legalization of
same-sex marriage in 2015, the couple, who had been together for
over thirty years, filed a petition to terminate their adoption so
they could marry.155
On February 19, 2016, the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia granted Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Ainora’s Consent Petition
for Termination of Parental Rights.156 While not expressly granted or
prohibited by statute, the court found it had the equitable authority
to terminate Mr. Ainora’s parental rights to Mr. Buchanan.157 In
utilizing its equitable authority, the court was mindful that this
situation was atypical: “Mr. Buchanan [was] not a ‘child’ who must be
placed with a family, but rather [was] a sixty-seven year old” who
fully consented to both entering into and, subsequently, terminating
the parent-child relationship.158 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that terminating the adoption was in the best interest of the adoptee,
Mr. Buchanan, because:
Mr. Buchanan’s physical, mental, and emotional health will only be
enriched upon termination, as he will finally be able to marry his
partner of over three decades and receive the societal and personal
recognition and protection associated with such. . . . Mr. Buchanan’s
relationship with Mr. Ainora will only be strengthened if they are
allowed to marry, and the romantic and loving nature of their
relationship will finally be accurately reflected in their legal statuses.159

The court also opined that terminating the adoption was not
only in the best interest of Mr. Buchanan, but was also in the best
interest of Mr. Ainora, as it would allow both individuals to enjoy the
“plethora of legal, financial, and personal benefits of marriage.”160
At the heart of the court’s decision was dignity.161 The court
desired to bestow upon the couple the dignity and freedom to
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

See 17 WEST’S PA. PRAC., FAMILY LAW § 32:15 (7th ed. 2017).
Buchanan, No. 2015 DRB 4111, 2016 WL 2755848 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2016).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *6.
Id.
See id. at *7.
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marry after three decades together.162 Recognizing that the law
now allows for same-sex marriage, the court found it illogical to
keep this couple in a legal paradigm that inaccurately reflected
their relationship when a more appropriate legal relationship
was available.163
B. Delaware: In re the Adoption of C.A.H.W.164
Strikingly similar to the facts of Buchanan,165 H.M.A. adopted
her partner, C.A.H.W, to secure significant financial benefits and
legally formalize their romantic relationship.166 The adoption was
granted by the Family Court of Delaware on July 17, 1995.167
By 2013, the parties had been together for thirty-three years.168
On October 16, 2012, H.M.A. motioned to vacate the couple’s
adoption in order to enter into a civil union.169 H.M.A. and
C.A.H.W. both consented to the adoption annulment.170 They
contended that a civil union would be “a more appropriate way to
recognize the strong emotional bond between the parties.”171
Such a legal option, however, was not available to the couple at
the time of their 1995 adoption.172 Thus, H.M.A. sought to annul
the adoption under Family Court Civil Rule 60(b)(5), arguing
that the adoption was no longer equitable, and under Family
Court Civil Rule 60(b)(6), arguing that it was in the interest of
justice to annul the adoption.173
In determining that the adoption was no longer equitable and
that an adoption annulment was in the interest of justice, the court
focused on the scarce legal options available to the couple in 1995.174
“At that time in Delaware, adult adoption was essentially the
parties’ only available legal option to formalize their close
relationship and their financial rights and responsibilities toward

Id.
Id. (“Fortunately, the law no longer prevents Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Ainora from
legally marrying and they, and other same sex couples, no longer have to resort to actions
such as an adoption to gain a few basic legal rights accorded to married couples.”).
164 In re the Adoption of C.A.H.W., No. 95-05-03-A, 2013 WL 1748618 (Fam. Ct. Del.
Mar. 28, 2013).
165 See supra notes 154–155 and accompanying text.
166 Adoption of C.A.H.W., at *1.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. (“On March 22, 2011, the Delaware legislature passed a bill allowing same-sex
couples to enter into civil unions with all the rights and responsibilities of marriage under
Delaware law.”).
173 Id.
174 Id. at *2.
162
163
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one another.”175 Yet, now, the law has changed and provides more
appropriate legal avenues for same-sex couples through the civil
union statute.176 But, as the court recognized, by virtue of their
adoption, H.M.A. and C.A.H.W. might be ineligible to enter into a
civil union since they were legally parent and child.177 Thus, since the
law in Delaware now allowed same-sex couples to enter civil unions
and reap the same benefits as married couples, the court found that
it was in the interest of justice to vacate the adoption and allow
H.M.A and C.A.H.W the opportunity to seek a civil union.178
C. Pennsylvania: In re Adoption of R.A.B., Jr.179
Mirroring the facts of both Buchanan and In re the Adoption
of C.A.H.W, N.M.E (Mr. Nino Esposito) adopted his same-sex
partner R.A.B., Jr. (Mr. Drew Bosee) on April 20, 2012.180 The
adoption stemmed from the couple’s desire to become a cognizable
family unit and secure inheritance and financial benefits.181 By
2015, the couple had been together for over forty years.182
With the legalization of same-sex marriage in Pennsylvania in
2014 and nationwide in 2015, the couple fervently desired to
marry.183 However, given their existing parent-child relationship,
marriage was prohibited.184 Thus, on March 23, 2015, the couple filed
a petition with the Orphan’s Court to annul their adoption.185 The
petition included an affidavit of Mr. Bosee’s consent to the adoption
annulment.186 Yet, even with both parties consent to the adoption
revocation, the petition was denied.187 The lower court reasoned that
state law barred the adoption revocation.188 On appeal, Mr. Esposito
focused on two issues: (1) whether the denial of their adoption
revocation petition violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Id.
Id.
Under Delaware law, “[a] civil union is prohibited and void between a person and
his or her ancestor, descendant, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt,
niece, nephew[,] or first cousin.” Id. Thus, H.M.A. and C.A.H.W., legally considered
ancestors and descendants, were not eligible to enter into a civil union. See id.
178 Id.
179 In re Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d 332, 333 (Pa. Super Ct. 2016).
180 See id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 333, 335.
184 Id. at 333.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. (“There is no specific statute in Pennsylvania relating to the revocation of
decrees of adoption nor does our present adoption statute contain any provisions
therefor.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Schapiro, supra note ; 17 WEST’S PA.
P RAC ., F AMILY L AW § 32:15 (7th ed. 2017) (stating that adoption revocation in
Pennsylvania has historically only been permitted in rare circumstances).
175
176
177
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United States Constitution, and (2) whether the Orphan’s Court
abused its discretion by failing to consider the best interest of the
adoptee, Mr. Bosee.189
The Superior Court reversed and remanded.190 In coming to
its determination, the Superior Court recognized that at the time
“adult adoption was [the couple’s] only option to become a family,
as they were prohibited from marrying by an unconstitutional
statute.”191 However, times have changed.192 The court referenced
Whitewood,193 which legalized same-sex marriage in Pennsylvania,
and Obergefell,194 which not only legalized same-sex marriage on a
national level but also held that state laws are “invalid to the
extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the
same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.”195 In light of
this precedent, the court reasoned that denying the adoption
annulment “frustrated the couple’s ability to marry,” which was in
directly conflicted with Whitewood’s and Obergefell’s holdings.196
Thus, the court expressly gave the Orphan’s Court the authority to
annul same-sex adult adoptions, allowing same-sex partners to
exercise their constitutional right to marry.197
D. The Problem: Sifting through a Sea of Court-Issued Adoption
Revocations
Since all of the aforementioned cases eventually permitted
the annulment of same-sex adult adoptions, it may be argued
that no true problem exists. Same-sex couples, often in their
mid-sixties, should wait for a court’s case-by-case determination.
While this is a possible option, the issue comes down to efficiency.
The courts that have revoked same-sex adult adoptions did not
provide guidelines for courts or couples to effectively address
same-sex adult adoption revocation and merely stated that courts
have the authority to revoke these adoptions. Thus, without clear
statutory guidelines, these couples have waited and will continue
to wait in this legal limbo-land for far too long.198
Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d at 333.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 335.
Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Id. at 2605.
196 Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d at 336.
197 Id.
198 See Buchanan, No. 2015 DRB 4111, 2016 WL 2755848 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18,
2016) (taking over a year to terminate parental rights); In re the Adoption of C.A.H.W.,
No. 95-05-03-A, 2013 WL 1748618 (Fam. Ct. Del. Mar. 28, 2013) (requiring over a year to
annul the adoption and enter a civil union); Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d at 332 (failing to
secure adoption revocation after multiple years).
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
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However, all of the aforementioned cases touch on a vital
component of the solution: Consent. In each of the aforementioned
cases, both parties—the adopter and the adoptee—consented to
the adoption annulment. This commonality is significant because
it harkens back to the purpose of adoption—protecting the
adoptee.199 Thus, a comprehensive solution must both streamline
the adoption revocation process and ensure that consent is duly
given, especially by the adoptee.
IV. THE SOLUTION: AMENDING CURRENT ADULT ADOPTION CODES
Not recognized at common law, adoption, including adult
adoption, is the product of state-specific statutory provisions.200
Although created by statute, a great number of states have no
statutory provisions addressing adult adoption revocations.201
Since adoption was created by statute, any solution to the legal
limbo-land trapping Mr. Esposito, Mr. Bosee, and other same-sex
couples must be statutory in nature. Thus, states are urged to
amend their adoption codes by enacting statutory language that
requires the consent of both parties and allows for the swift
annulment of same-sex adult adoptions.
This Part compares current state adoption codes, breaking
states into three distinct groups based on their respective statutory
language. Further, it advocates for all states to model California’s
Family Code when creating a statutory adult adoption revocation
process. Moreover, this Part also discusses how California’s
statutory language can be improved to allow for the swift
annulment of same-sex adult adoptions.
A. States and Same-Sex Couples need Statutory Guidance to
Efficiently Annul Adoptions
States need to provide comprehensive statutory requirements
to streamline same-sex adult adoption revocation. Currently, both
same-sex couples and lower courts have no statutory guidance to
effectuate adult adoption revocation.202 Same-sex couples, like Mr.
Esposito and Mr. Bosee, have no clear guidance when seeking an
adoption revocation because the majority of states lack a statutory
revocation process. These couples can only file a petition, sign an
affidavit, and say a prayer.

McCabe, supra note 13, at 304.
Id. at 302.
See 17 WEST’S PA. PRAC., FAMILY LAW § 32:15 (7th ed. 2017); but see CAL. FAM.
CODE § 9340 (1993).
202 The one exception to this is California’s Family Code, which provides fairly
comprehensive revocation requirements. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9340 (1993).
199
200
201
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1. Outline of Current Statutory Language
Currently, most states’ adoption codes do not address
adoption revocation, but instead only highlight the absolute
permanency of adult adoption. Some states even uphold the
finality of adult adoption despite the presence of fraud.203 In fact,
only twenty states have statutory language addressing adult
adoption revocation.204 Of these states, most only provide a limited
timeframe, such as six months or a year, to seek adult adoption
revocation205 and only one state fully addresses adult adoption
revocation by providing statutory guidelines for the revocation
process.206 This section analyzes the current statutory language
concerning adult adoption revocation starting with the states
discussed in Part III. It then analyzes the remaining states’
statutory language, breaking the states into three distinct groups.
a. Analysis of the District of Columbia’s, Delaware’s, and
Pennsylvania’s Respective Adoption Codes
The states207 discussed in Part III, the District of Columbia,
Delaware, and Pennsylvania, all lack comprehensive statutory
guidelines for adult adoption revocation. In fact, of the three, the
District of Columbia is the only one to provide any statutory
revocation period. Each of the three states’ adoption codes are
discussed in turn.
The District of Columbia’s code states, “An attempt to
invalidate a final decree of adoption by reason of a jurisdictional
or procedural defect may not be received by any court of the
District, unless regularly filed with the court within one year
following the date the final decree became effective.”208 By
providing such limited grounds for revocation (only jurisdictional
or procedural defect) within such a small timeframe (only one
year), the District of Columbia’s Code indirectly highlights the
irrevocability of adoption. Beyond the narrow situation set forth
in the statute, the adopter and the adoptee’s legal relationship is
set in stone.
Delaware’s statutory language, which expressly allows
for adult adoption, directly illustrates the permanency of

ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-216 (2018).
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9340 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-216 (2018); IND.
CODE § 31-19-14-2; D.C. CODE § 16-309 (2010).
205 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. § 170-B:21 (2018).
206 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9340 (1993).
207 As previously noted, for the purposes of this Article, unless otherwise indicated,
“states” includes all fifty states and the District of Columbia.
208 D.C. CODE § 16-309 (2010).
203
204
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adoption—perhaps even more forcefully than the District of
Columbia. Delaware’s Code declares:
Upon the issuance of the decree of adoption and forever thereafter, all
the duties, rights, privileges and obligations recognized by law
between parent and child shall exist between the petitioner or
petitioners and the person or persons adopted, as fully and to all
intents and purposes as if such person or persons were the lawful and
natural offspring or issue of the petitioner or petitioners.209

Thus, Delaware’s statutory language spells out the conundrum that
same-sex couples seeking adoption revocation face—in the eyes of
the law they are forever legally recognized as parent and child.
Lastly, as evidenced in In re Adoption of R.A.B., 210
Pennsylvania does not contain any statutory language
addressing adult adoption revocation or even discussing the
finality of adult adoption. Pennsylvania’s statutory language
merely states: “Any individual may be adopted, regardless of his
age or residence.”211 However, case law precedent implies that
Pennsylvania, like the District of Columbia and Delaware, also
views adult adoptions as irrevocable.212 Pennsylvania only grants
adoption revocation in rare circumstances, such as when there is
clear and convincing evidence of fraud.213
Thus, there is no statutory framework to revoke an adult
adoption under the laws of any of these three states. Of the three,
the District of Columbia at least provides a one-year grace period
when it comes to procedural and jurisdictional claims, whereas,
Pennsylvania does not even contain a statutory provision about
the permanency or revocability of adult adoption.214 Such a
complete lack of statutory guidance creates problems for
same-sex couples seeking adoption revocation and challenges for
courts attempting to justify adoption revocations.
b. Analysis of the Remaining States’ Adoption Codes
After analyzing the adult adoption statutes of all the
states,215 three groups emerge: (1) states that outline the extreme
finality of adult adoption and fail to mention adult adoption
revocation, (2) states that provide a very narrow revocation window,

13 DEL. CODE § 954 (1953) (emphasis added).
153 A.3d 332, 333 (Pa. Super Ct. 2016).
211 PA. STAT. § 2311 (1981).
212 See 17 WEST’S PA. PRAC., FAMILY LAW § 32:15 (7th ed. 2017).
213 Id.
214 Delaware may also include a six-month window for adoption revocation. See 13
DEL. CODE § 918 (2001). However, it is not clear if this window extends to the adoption of
adults or just the adoption of children. Id.
215 (Or lack thereof.)
209
210
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and (3) states that provide a comprehensive statutory adult adoption
revocation process.
States in group one stress the irrevocable nature of adult
adoption.216 For example, Delaware’s adoption code states that
adoption establishes an eternal parent-child relationship.217
Similarly, Alaska’s adoption code declares that adoption
terminates “all legal relationships between the adopted person
and the natural parents and other relatives of the adopted person,
so that the adopted person thereafter is a stranger to the former
relatives for all purposes . . . .”218 Florida’s adoption code parallels
Alaska’s code and also labels the adoptee a “stranger” to his or her
natural relatives.219 Further, Arizona’s statutory language states
that upon the entry of the adoption decree, the adoptee’s
relationship with his or her natural parents “is completely severed
and all legal rights, privileges, duties, and obligations and other
legal consequences of the relationship cease to exist . . . .”220 Such
language emphasizes the absolute finality of adoption. In fact, all
of the states in group one exclude any statutory window for adult
adoption revocation, therefore leaving adopted same-sex couples
eternally cemented in their parent-child relationship.
States in group two include those that provide a narrow
timeframe for adult adoption revocation.221 For example, the
District of Columbia’s Code, discussed above, only provides a
one-year period to challenge an adoption decree.222 And such a
challenge must be based on a procedural or jurisdictional
defect.223 Further, Arkansas’ adoption code provides a limited

216 The states in group one include: Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kansas, and Mississippi, Montana, New York, Tennessee, and Texas. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.130 (1974); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-117 (1970); 13 DEL. CODE § 945
(1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.172 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-17 (1955); MON.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-109 (2017); N.Y. CODE ANN. § 117 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-122
(2014); VERNON’S TEX. STAT. & CODES ANN. FAM. CODE § 162.507 (Sept. 1, 2005).
Note, Alabama, Idaho, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, Wyoming, and Virginia were not
included in this Article because the aforementioned states either do not allow for adult
adoption (Idaho, Wyoming, and South Carolina) or have such specific adult adoption
criteria that same-sex adult adoption is essentially prohibited (Alabama, Ohio, Utah, and
Virginia). See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, supra note 34.
217 13 DEL. CODE § 945 (1953).
218 ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.130 (1974) (emphasis added).
219 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.172 (West 2002).
220 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-117 (1970) (emphasis added).
221 The states in group two are Arkansas, Colorado, the District of Colombia, Georgia,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-309 (2010); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-9-216 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. § 170-B:21 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-15-15
(2003); 52 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.02 (2007).
222 D.C. CODE § 16-309 (2010).
223 Id.
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timeframe for adult adoption revocation and also highlights the
utter finality of adoption. It states that “upon the expiration of
one (1) year after an adoption decree is issued, the decree cannot
be questioned by any person including the petitioner [the individual
that sought the adoption], in any manner upon any ground,
including fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give any required
notice, or lack of jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject
matter . . . .”224 Arkansas’ statutory language spells out the serious
problem facing some same-sex couples—that even in the presence of
fraud or a complete lack of notice, the legal relationship of
parent-child remains. Similarly, Oklahoma’s adoption code states
that “[n]o adoption may be challenged on any ground either by a
direct or collateral attack more than three (3) months after the
entry of the final adoption decree regardless of whether the decree
is void or voidable . . . .”225 Thus, similar to Arkansas’ statutory
language, Oklahoma’s statutory language allows the parent-child
relationship to remain even if the decree is void.226 Other states, like
Colorado227 and Minnesota,228 also provide a limited timeframe to
challenge and revoke adult adoptions.
Still included in group two are states that provide a unique, yet
limited, window for adult adoption revocation. For example, North
Carolina provides a very specific window for adult adoption
revocation. Its statutory language states that “[a] parent or
guardian whose consent or relinquishment was obtained by fraud or
duress may, within six months of the time the fraud or duress is or
ought reasonably to have been discovered, move to have the decree
of adoption set aside and the consent declared void.”229 Similarly,
Indiana’s adoption only allows a natural parent to challenge an
adoption decree within six months after entry of the adoption decree
or within one year after the adoptive parent’s obtain custody.230

224 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-216 (1977); see also N.H. REV. STAT. § 170-B:21 (2018)
(containing the exact same statutory language as Arkansas); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 14-15-15 (2003) (containing the exact same statutory language as Arkansas).
225 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 7505-7.2 (1998).
226 Id.
227 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-214 (2012) (allowing for procedural or jurisdictional
attacks within ninety-one days after entry of the adoption decree and allowing adoption
revocation at anytime if there is clear and convincing evidence that such revocation is in
the best interest of the adoptee).
228 52 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.02 (2007) (allowing an adoption to be revoked within
ninety days after entry of the adoption decree upon a showing of “(1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial; (3) fraud
(whether denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of
an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the order”).
229 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-607 (2000).
230 IND. CODE § 31-19-14-2 (1997).
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Unlike most of the other states in group two, North Carolina and
Indiana not only limit the revocation timeframe but also limit the
individual allowed to revoke the adoption.
Maine, another state in group two, provides a much broader
scope for revocation. Maine’s adoption code allows a judge “on
petition of [two] or more persons and after notice and hearing,
[to] reverse and annul a decree of the Probate Court” if the judge
finds the adoption was “obtained as a result of fraud, duress or
illegal procedures,” or if there is good cause to reverse the
adoption.231 Maine’s broad statutory language provides for fairly
expansive adult adoption revocation. In fact, theoretically, courts
in Maine would be able to annul same-sex adult adoptions
because there is “good cause” (i.e., constitutional grounds) to
revoke the adoptions and allow these couples to marry.232
However, Maine’s statutory language still has a significant
flaw—it fails to outline a clear revocation process.
Conversely, California, the only state in group three,
provides a clear statutory framework for the adult adoption
revocation process. California’s Family Code even includes a
section dedicated to adult adoption revocation.233 California’s
statutory guidelines highlight the significant flaw in all other
statutory provisions—the utter lack of a comprehensive
procedure to revoke adult adoptions.234 Unlike other states where
adult adoption revocation may not be possible even in the
presence of fraud, California provides clear procedures to
efficiently revoke same-sex adult adoption.235
2. California’s Adoption Provisions—Providing a Clear and
Comprehensive Adult Adoption Revocation Process
California’s Family Code states:
(a) Any person who has been adopted under this part [i.e., the adult
adoptee] may, upon written notice to the adoptive parent, file a
petition to terminate the relationship of parent and child. The petition
shall state the name and address of the petitioner, the name and
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-315 (1997).
Id.
See generally CAL. FAM. CODE § 9340 (1993). Within California’s Family Code,
Division 13 “Adoption” includes Part 3 “Adoption of Adults and married Minors” which
includes Chapter 3 “Procedure for Terminating Adult Adoption.” See id.
234 California not only allows for the revocation of adult adoption but details what an
adoptee must include in his or her petition to terminate (i.e., the name and address of the
petitioner, the name and address of the adoptive parent, the date and place of the
adoption, and the circumstances upon which the petition is based). Id. Further, if the
adopter consents to the termination then the court may immediately terminate the
parent-child relationship. Id.
235 As outlined below, California even includes a procedure if the adopter does not
consent to the adoption revocation. See id.
231
232
233
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address of the adoptive parent, the date and place of the adoption, and
the circumstances upon which the petition is based.
(b) If the adoptive parent consents in writing to the termination, an
order terminating the relationship of parent and child may be issued
by the court without further notice.
(c) If the adoptive parent does not consent in writing to the
termination, a written response shall be filed within 30 days of the
date of mailing of the notice, and the matter shall be set for hearing.
The court may require an investigation by the county probation officer
or the department.236

Instead of limiting adult adoption revocation to a narrow and
specific timeframe,237 California allows for expansive revocation and
efficiently allows adult adoptees to terminate the legal parent-child
relationship. The beauty and efficiency of California’s process is
evident in subsections (a) and (b). Subsection (a) removes any
mystery concerning the requirements for adult adoption
revocation because it simply lists what is needed. Furthermore,
subsection (b) highlights the efficiency of the procedure—namely,
once both parties consent to the revocation the court may
terminate the adoption “without further notice.”238 Upon applying
such statutory language to Mr. Esposito and Mr. Bosee’s situation,
the couple’s adoption would likely have been terminated years
earlier.239 Moreover, California’s statutory language even provides
guidelines when the adoptive parent refuses to consent.240
Not only does subsection (b) facilitate efficient revocation, its
emphasis on consent provides a vital aspect of the adoption
revocation process. Specifically, requiring the consent of both
parties assuages concerns about the adoptee’s vulnerability.241
Instead of allowing the adopter to leave the adoptee high and dry

Id.
See, e.g., 52 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.02 (2007) (allowing revocation within ninety
days); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-216 (2018) (providing a one-year revocation period).
238 CAL. FAM. CODE § 9340(b) (1993).
239 However, note that the adopter, Mr. Esposito, instead of the adoptee, initiated the
termination proceedings, and the adoptee, Mr. Bosee, instead of the adopter, submitted an
affidavit consenting to the revocation. In re Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d 332, 333
(Pa. Super Ct. 2016).
240 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9340(c) (1993). Arguably, the situation described in subsection
(c) will likely not arise in the context of same-sex adult adoption since both partners likely
desire, and will consent to, the revocation. For confirmation, see generally the couples in In
re the Adoption of C.A.H.W., No. 95-05-03-A, 2013 WL 1748618 (Fam. Ct. Del. Mar. 28,
2013), Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d at 333, and Buchanan, No. 2015 DRB 4111, 2016 WL
2755848 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2016). In each case, both partners desired to revoke
the adoption to either marry or enter a civil union. Adoption of C.A.H.W., 2013 WL
1748618; Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d at 333; Buchanan, 2016 WL 2755848.
241 Historically, adoption’s general irrevocability stems from a desire to protect the
adoptee, often considered the fragile or vulnerable party. Here, consent provides adequate
protection to the adoptee.
236
237
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by unilaterally terminating the adoption,242 subsection (b) ensures
that both parties agree to the revocation. Furthermore, requiring
the adoptee to instigate the termination process also guarantees
that the adoptee is protected since he or she has to individually
begin the termination process.
While California’s statutory language is leaps and bounds
beyond its sister states, improvements can be implemented to
increase efficiency. First, an affidavit of the adopter’s consent
should be listed as an optional item to include in the initial petition.
Including an affidavit of the adopter’s consent in the petition will
streamline the revocation process because all required documents,
including the adopter’s consent, will be submitted at one time.
Furthermore, using the term “affidavit” provides a concrete
example of acceptable written consent. Thus, same-sex couples
seeking revocation will know at the onset exactly what is needed for
revocation. Second, the statutory language should be modified to
allow both the adoptee and the adopter to instigate the revocation
proceedings if the adoptee is not mentally disabled.243 Allowing both
parties to begin the revocation process increases efficiency. For
example, let’s look at Mr. Esposito and Mr. Bosee’s situation. In
that case, Mr. Esposito, the adopter, filed the petition to annul the
adoption.244 He initiated (or attempted to initiate) the revocation
process. However, even though Mr. Esposito’s petition included an
affidavit of Mr. Bosee’s consent, the petition would have violated
California’s statutory language.245 Mr. Esposito and Mr. Bosee
would have to begin the process again because the adopter, not the
adoptee, initiated the proceedings. Such a redo would cost the
couple precious time and money. Thus, instead of forcing an
adopted same-sex couple to begin the process again, merely because
the wrong partner commenced the process, both parties should be
able to begin the revocation process.
This suggested change might be challenged by some since it
arguably provides less protection to the adoptee. However, in adult
adoptions, consent provides adequate protection.246 As courts and
242 Remember, that even if the adoption is revoked the adoptee can never re-join the
natural parents’ bloodline for inheritances purposes. See Snodgrass, supra note 14, at 84.
243 However, if the adoptee is a mentally disabled individual then the court should
not allow the adopter to unilaterally terminate the adoption. Rather, the court should
apply the “best interests of the child” test when determining if revocation is appropriate.
This ensures that the mentally disabled adoptee is sufficiently protected. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-214 (2012).
244 Adoption of R.A.B., 153 A.3d at 334.
245 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9340 (1993) (limiting the commencement of the adoption
revocation process to “[a]ny person who has been adopted under this part” (i.e., the adoptee)).
246 Again, the adopter and the adoptee should only have the right to individually
begin the process if the adoptee is not mentally disabled. See supra note 243 and
accompanying text.
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scholars have noted the need to protect an adoptee is lessened in an
adult adoption because of the participants’ ages.247 Thus, by still
requiring that the non-instigating party consent to the revocation,
both the adopter and the adoptee are sufficiently protected.
B. Statutory—Not Equitable—Relief Provides the Needed
Comprehensive Framework
Relying on judicial equitable relief is not sufficient to address
same-sex adult adoption. In fact, it only masks the root of the
issue: The statutes themselves.248 Without amending state adoption
codes, courts will have to consider each adult adoption revocation on
a case-by-case basis. Such an arbitrary and individual process keeps
couples, like Mr. Esposito and Mr. Bosee, in a legal relationship
that does not adequately reflect their true relationship for far too
long. Thus, while relying on judicial equitable power provides a
solution,249 its fatal flaw is its inefficiency. Instead, amending state
adoption codes allows states to outline clear procedures for adoption
revocation. Such a comprehensive statutory structure is necessary
since many courts may face an increase in these types of adoption
revocation petitions.250
Since “[a]doption was unknown at common law and is strictly
statutory,” states are urged to amend the root of the problem—their
respective adoption statutes.251 States must amend their adoption
codes to streamline same-sex adult adoption revocation and allow
same-sex couples to exercise their constitutional right to marry.
However, any statutory amendment must ensure that the adoptee
and the adopter are protected. California’s statutory language,
which provides a clear revocation process and ample protection for
the participants, sets forth a comprehensive model that all states
should follow.252 However, states should not blindly mimic
California’s statutory language. States, instead, should implement
statutory language that allows both the adoptee and the adopter

247 McCabe, supra note 13, at 304; Buchanan, No. 2015 DRB 4111, 2016 WL 2755848
(D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2016) (noting “Mr. Buchanan [was] not a ‘child’ who must be
placed with a family, but rather [was] a sixty-seven year old” that consented to the
adoption revocation).
248 But see Mileto, supra note 33, at 320–22. Note, Mileto mentions that courts should
look to state adoption codes, but she does not urge states to amend those codes. See id. at
320–21. Instead, Mileto seems to rely only on the court’s equitable powers to revoke
same-sex adult adoptions as the adequate solution. See id. at 321–22.
249 In fact, every case in this Article that has dealt with the revocation of same-sex adult
adoption has found that courts have the power to annul such adoptions. See In re the
Adoption of C.A.H.W. No. 95-05-03-A, 2013 WL 1748618 (Fam. Ct. Del. Mar. 28, 2013); In re
Adoption of R.A.B. 153 A.3d 332, 333 (Pa. Super Ct. 2016); Buchanan, 2016 WL 2755848.
250 See 17 WEST’S PA. PRAC., FAMILY LAW § 32:15 (7th ed. 2017).
251 Id. § 32:1.
252 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9340 (1993).
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to commence the revocation process, while also requiring the
non-instigating party’s consent to the adoption revocation. Such
statutory framework ensures that same-sex couples can quickly
revoke their adoption while affording adequate protection.
Furthermore, consent—mandated by statute—provides adequate
protection to adult adoptees who do not require a heightened
level of protection like child adoptees.253
V. CONCLUSION: TRULY LIVING OUT THE TENANTS OF
OBERGEFELL
Before the monumental case, Obergefell v. Hodges,254
same-sex couples had scarce legal options to formalize their
relationship. In the face of such limited legal avenues, some
same-sex couples turned to adult adoption. In fact, adult
adoption was the only way to create a legal family unit, allowing
couples to secure vast rights and benefits.255 Yet, adoption was
far from a perfect legal option for same-sex couples. Instead of
legally recognizing their commitment, partnership, and love,
same-sex couples that adopted each other were labeled “parent
and child.” In fact, before the nationwide legalization of same-sex
marriage in 2015, all same-sex couples’ relationships were never
legally recognized or celebrated to the same extent as
opposite-sex couples. But all this changed with Obergefell.
In Obergefell the Supreme Court passionately declared:
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest
ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a
marital union, two people become something greater than once they
were. . . . It would misunderstand these men and women to say they
disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it,
respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for
themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness,
excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for
equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them
that right.256

By recognizing same-sex couples’ constitutional right to marry,
Obergefell indirectly rendered same-sex adult adoptions obsolete.
But, the Court in Obergefell also highlighted the intrinsic problem
of adult adoption—irrevocability. Generally, adult adoption cannot
be revoked. For example, even in the presence of fraud or utter
invalidity, the parent-child relationship created by adoption often

253 See McCabe, supra note 13, at 304 (noting that “the many concerns plaguing [child
adoption] are no longer prevalent once the potential adoptee is an adult”).
254 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
255 Snodgrass, supra note 14, at 75–81.
256 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
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cannot be undone.257 Further, most state adoption codes lack any
reference to adult adoption revocation or only provide a severely
limited revocation window. Thus, faced with such permanency,
some same-sex couples that adopted each other cannot participate
in “one of civilization’s oldest institutions.”258 They cannot reap the
immense financial and psychological benefits associated with
marriage. But most importantly, they cannot exercise their
constitutional right to marry. They are, instead, trapped in a legal
paradigm that fails to reflect the true nature of their relationship.
To truly live out the constitutional tenants of Obergefell and
ensure that all same-sex couples can marry, including those that
adopted each other pre-Obergefell, states must amend their
adoption codes. Specifically, states must amend their adoption
codes, using California’s statutory language as a guide, to allow for
the efficient annulment of same-sex adult adoptions. Same-sex
couples like Mr. Esposito and Mr. Bosee have waited decades for the
recognition of their inherent right to marry—now is the time to
ensure that all same-sex couples can exercise that inherent right.

257 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-216 (2018) (noting that after the passage of one year an
adoption decree cannot be questioned for any reason, including fraud); but see ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9-315 (1997) (allowing a court to annul an adoption on the basis of fraud).
258 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.

